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PAUL HASTINGS, JANOFSKY & WALKER 6 Chicago, Illinois 60661 Telephone: (312) 775-8000 Facsimile: (312) 775-8100 7 LLP 3579 Valley Centre Drive San Diego, CA 92130 Telephone: (858) 720-2500 Facsimile (858) 720-2555 8 9 10 Attorneys for Plaintiff ICU MEDICAL, INC. Attorneys for Defendant ALARÍS MEDICAL SYSTEMS, INC. 11 12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA WESTERN DIVISION 13 14 15 ICU MEDICAL, INC., a Delaware corporation, CASE NO. SA CV 04-689 MRP (VBKx) 16 Plaintiff, JOINT STIPULATION FILED IN SUPPORT OF AND IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT ALARIS MEDICAL SYSTEMS, INC.'s MOTION TO COMPEL ICU'S RESPONSE TO ALARIS'S REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION NOS. 9, 10, 11, 23, 27, 38, 39 17 18 ALARIS MEDICAL SYSTEMS, INC., 19 a Delaware corporation, 20 Defendant. 21 ALARIS MEDICAL SYSTEMS, INC., April 3, 2006 Date: 22 a Delaware corporation, Time: 10:00 a.m. Judge: Hon. Mariana R. Pfaelzer 23 Counterclaim plaintiff, 24 Discovery Cutoff Date: March 17, 2006 Pretrial Conference Date: August 28, 2006 ICU MEDICAL, INC., 25 a Delaware corporation, Trial Date: October 3, 2006 26 Counterclaim defendant. 27 28

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I. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENTS

A. Defendant ALARIS's Introductory Statement

This patent litigation between Defendant ALARIS Medical Systems, Inc. ("ALARIS") and Plaintiff ICU Medical, Inc. ("ICU") began in a furor in June 2004 from ICU's request for temporary injunctive relief. Defendant ALARIS moves the Court pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 37 on a deficiency in ICU's discovery responses.

ICU is the plaintiff, counterclaim defendant and the named patent owner of the patents in suit. ICU originally only asserted U.S. Patent No. 6,682,509 ("the 509 Patent"), but now asserts four patents ("the Subject Patents"), against ALARIS's SmartSite® Products.^{2,3} ICU's President, CEO, and Chairman, George A. Lopez, is the named inventor for the Subject Patents. The technology in this case generally relates to medical devices that include needle-free valves for preventing accidental needle-sticks.

ALARIS is the defendant and counterclaim plaintiff. ALARIS's initial discovery was served in September 2004. (Ex. 1, Initial Case Schedule).⁴ The Court amended the initial case schedule on November 9, 2006. (Ex. 10, Amd. Schedule.)

ALARIS seeks an order compelling ICU to produce all information related to ICU's election to rely on the advice of counsel in the <u>Medex v. ICU</u> litigation. ICU intentionally waived the privilege in <u>Medex</u> as a matter of litigation strategy, and cannot reclaim its waiver.

ALARIS continues to investigate other ICU deficiencies and whether any of ICU's attempts to address the deficiencies are sufficient.

² In addition to the 509 Patent, ICU asserts U.S. Patent No. 5,685,866, U.S. Patent No. 5,873,862, and U.S. Patent No. 6,572,592. These patents claim priority back to two applications filed in 1991 and 1992, and thus, share a common specification (i.e. their written description and drawings are the same).

³ "SmartSite Products" refers to SmartSite[®] and SmartSite[®] Plus Valves or products that incorporate a SmartSite[®] or SmartSite[®] Plus Valve.

⁴ Exhibits 1-10 are attached to the Declaration of David D. Headrick ("Headr. Decl.").

ICU confirmed that it is withholding information, which was the subject of ICU's waiver in the <u>Medex</u> case, on the grounds of privilege. ICU acknowledged that it has not listed the <u>Medex</u> information on its privilege log. (Ex. 2, 09/01/05 Headrick Ltr. to Platt.)

The prior Medex v. ICU litigation involved ICU's CLAVE connector products and Medex's U.S. Pat. No. RE 35,841 ("Medex's 841 Patent"). ICU asserts in this case that its CLAVE connector is an embodiment of one or more claims of the Subject Patents.

ICU has already produced one "opinion of counsel" from the <u>Medex</u> litigation. The <u>Medex</u> opinion produced to ALARIS discusses, as expected, the structure and function of the CLAVE connector. Likewise, the withheld information is reasonably likely to discuss the structure and operation of the CLAVE connector products (alleged to be an embodiment of one or more of the Subject Patents) and/or may also discuss and characterize pertinent prior art, including Medex's 841 Patent, and the level of skill in, and the scope of, the prior art. As such, the withheld information may bear on ALARIS's defenses, such as obviousness and ICU's damages claims.

With six weeks remaining in fact discovery, an order compelling ICU is needed and appropriate. ALARIS has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with ICU's attorneys by phone and letter in an effort to secure the requested discovery in a timely fashion without court action. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a); Local Rule 37-1. Accordingly, ALARIS requests that this Court order immediate production.

B. Plaintiff ICU's Introductory Statement

Waivers of privilege in patent cases are narrowly construed. In particular, a waiver of attorney-client privilege with respect to one patent does not waive privilege with respect to another patent, even if the patents are related. What is at issue here are three privileged attorney-client communications that concern an unrelated litigation

(Medex v. ICU) over an unrelated patent (Medex's U.S. Pat. No. RE 35,841) owned by an unrelated third party (Medex). ICU's waiver of privilege in the Medex case, which was essentially compelled by precedent that has since been overturned by the Federal Circuit, does not extend to this litigation.

ALARIS clouds this essential issue by focusing more on the imagined contents of the privileged communications instead of focusing on whether discovery is forbidden because the documents are privileged. The Court should also note the great disconnect between ALARIS's description of what it seeks to compel and the actual language of the discovery request. ALARIS says that "ALARIS Document Request No. 11 on its face captures the specific information sought." (See footnote 6, below.) The Court can see that this is not the case:

What ALARIS seeks to compel all information related to ICU's election to rely on the advice of counsel defense in the prior Medex v. ICU patent lawsuit (the

"Medex litigation"). (See p. 7.)

The text of Document Request No. 11 All documents referring or relating to any product, whether commercially available or not, that ICU contends is covered by any claim of the Subject Patent.

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By seeking "all information related to ICU's election to rely on the advice of counsel defense in the prior Medex v. ICU patent lawsuit," ALARIS is overreaching— Document Request No. 11, as overbroad as it is, does not extend so far. And there is no other document request that is now properly before the Court, because ALARIS has failed to include the full text of any other document request, and ICU's response thereto, as required by Local Rule 37-2.1.

Furthermore, there is no need to invade ICU's privilege for ALARIS to be able to prepare its case. ALARIS has already received in discovery all the documents needed to satisfy its stated needs. ICU has produced 60 samples of its CLAVE

products, along with the assembly drawings—the "blueprints" for the products—and the instructions for use of those products. This is the primary source for information about the "structure and operation of the CLAVE connector products." Similarly, ICU has produced all of the prior art that it has, and will answer any remaining questions in expert discovery.

ALARIS clouds the issues in other ways. For example, ALARIS suggests that because ICU produced one "opinion of counsel" from the *Medex* litigation, there is no reason not to produce any others. In so arguing, ALARIS misleads the Court by failing to make it clear that the produced document was a non-privileged letter from ICU's trial counsel addressed to adversarial trial counsel. The letter explained ICU's contentions with respect to the Medex patent, much like a response to a contention interrogatory. Unlike the three letters at issue in this motion, 5 that letter did not contain confidential advice between an attorney and client.

In summary, the attorney-client communications at issue here remain privileged for purposes of this litigation. ICU has satisfied its discovery obligations with respect to the structure and operation of its CLAVE products by producing the product blueprints and the instructions for their use. The requested discovery is cumulative and unnecessarily invades the confidential relationship between attorney and client.

For these reasons, the Court should deny ALARIS's motion.

For another example of how ALARIS confuses the issues, ALARIS enigmatically refers to the fact that ICU did not initially list the three attorney-client communications on its privilege log, without explaining how this relates to its motion to compel. If ALARIS means to suggest to the Court that ICU did not satisfy Rule 26(b)(5), it should have said so outright. Regardless, ALARIS again fails to tell the whole story. The parties have met and conferred on this issue, and ALARIS agreed that ICU could include these letters in the next supplementation of its privilege log (Ex. 2, 09/01/05 Headrick Ltr. to Platt at 1, 4). ICU has met its obligations under Rule 26(b)(5), and ALARIS cannot argue otherwise.

II. ALARIS'S CONTENTIONS AND POINTS AND AUTHORITIES REGARDING ICU'S REFUSAL TO RESPOND TO ALARIS'S LEGITIMATE DISCOVERY REQUESTS

A. ICU Has The Burden To Justify Its Resistance To The Requested Discovery

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) provides:

Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii).

"Toward this end, Rule 26(b) is liberally interpreted to permit wide-ranging discovery of information even though the information may not be admissible at trial." <u>United States ex rel. Schwartz v. TRW, Inc.</u>, 211 F.R.D. 388, 392 (C.D. Cal. 2002); see also Ragge v. MCA/Universal Studios, 165 F.R.D. 601, 603-04 (C.D. Cal. 1995). The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 26 explains that a "variety of types of information not directly pertinent to the incident in suit could be relevant to the claims or defenses raised in a given action," such as "other incidents of the same type, or involving the same product . . . [or] information that could be used to impeach a likely witness, although not otherwise relevant to the claims or defenses" FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee's note (2000).

ICU is resisting discovery. Thus, ICU "has the burden to show that discovery should not be allowed, and has the burden of clarifying, explaining and supporting its objections." Cable & Computer Tech. v. Lockheed Sanders, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 646, 650 (C.D. Cal. 1997).

ALARIS has identified several ALARIS document requests to which the requested Medex case information is responsive, including Document Request No. 11.6 Document Request No. 11 and the related response are provided verbatim below.

[ALARIS's] REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11:

All documents referring or relating to any product, whether commercially available or not, that ICU contends is covered by any claim of the Subject Patent.

[ICU's] ORIGINAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.

11:

In addition to its General Objections, ICU objects to this request to the extent that it seeks information protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or the work-product doctrine, or any other lawfully recognized privilege or immunity.

ICU objects to producing confidential documents called for by this Request to the extent that it seeks information that is confidential to ICU or to third parties.

ICU objects to the request as seeking information that is not relevant to the claim or defense of any party.

ICU objects to the extent this request calls for a legal conclusion as the request requires ICU to draw a legal conclusion as to what products are "covered by any claim" of the '509 patent.

In addition to Document Request 11, ALARIS has identified other ALARIS document requests to which the withheld information from the Medex case is also responsive, namely, ALARIS Doc. Req. Nos. 9, 10, 23, 27, 38, and 39. (Ex. 3, ICU's Second Supplemental Responses to ALARIS's Requests For Production Nos. 1-46.) Because ALARIS Document Request No. 11 on its face captures the specific information sought, ALARIS has not provided the other document requests verbatim in this paper in an attempt to reduce the volume of this brief and in turn, the burden on the Court. These other document requests are attached as Exhibit 3 to this Joint Stipulation.

Further, ICU objects to this request as unduly burdensome to the extent it is duplicative of ALARIS' Request for Production No. 10.

Subject to and without waiving its specific and general objections, ICU responds as follows: ICU will produce relevant, responsive, non-privileged documents in its possession, custody or control.

[ICU's] SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11:

Subject to the General and Specific objections set forth in its original response and incorporated herein, reserving its right to supplement further, ICU supplements its response as follows:

ICU objects to the extent this request calls for a legal conclusion as the request requires ICU to draw a legal conclusion as to what products are "covered by any claim" of U.S. Patent Nos. 5,685,866, 5,873,862, 6,572,592, and 6,682,509.

Subject to and without waiving its specific and general objections, ICU responds as follows: ICU will produce relevant, responsive, non-privileged documents in its possession, custody or control.

[END OF RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11]

C. ICU Should Be Compelled To Produce All Information Related To ICU's Election To Rely On The Advice Of Counsel In The Medex v. ICU Litigation

ALARIS seeks all information related to ICU's election to rely on the advice of counsel defense in the prior <u>Medex v. ICU</u> patent lawsuit (the "<u>Medex</u> litigation"). (See, e.g., Ex. 3, ALARIS Request for Production No. 11.) In the <u>Medex</u> litigation, ICU elected to rely on advice of counsel in defense of Medex's claim that ICU's

CLAVE connector products infringed U.S. Pat. No. RE 35,841 ("the Medex 841 Patent").⁷

ICU waived the privilege and work product immunity in the <u>Medex</u> litigation. ICU confirmed that it is withholding information in this case (despite having waived that privilege and producing these documents in the <u>Medex</u> case) that was the subject of ICU's waiver in the <u>Medex</u> case on the grounds of privilege. (Ex. 2, 09/01/05 Headrick Ltr. to Platt.) ICU acknowledged that it has not logged (or appropriately supplemented) the withheld information on its privilege log in this case.

ALARIS proposed to have ICU immediately produce the requested information. ALARIS offered to resolve the dispute with regard to any confidentiality concerns of ICU by allowing such information, as appropriate, to be designated under the protective order. ICU refused ALARIS's offers and did not offer any other way to resolve the dispute.

1. The Advice Of Counsel Information From The Medex v. ICU Litigation Is Discoverable

In the <u>Medex</u> litigation, ICU's CLAVE connector product was at issue – it was accused of infringing the Medex 841 Patent. The information relied on by ICU in the <u>Medex</u> litigation describes the structure and operation of CLAVE connectors. ICU has already produced one opinion of counsel from the <u>Medex</u> case authored by Steven Nataupsky, who is also one of the attorneys involved in the prosecution of the Subject Patents. (Ex. 6, 07/08/99 Nataupsky Ltr. to Grossman.) The Nataupsky opinion confirms that the withheld information will likely discuss the operation of the CLAVE

^{&#}x27;ICU produced to Medex a written opinion of counsel and identified other documents as part of its waiver. (Ex. 4, 08/06/01 Platt Ltr. to Grossman (enclosing opinions); Ex. 5, ICU's Third Supp. Resp. to Medex's First Set of Interrog. (No. 5) (citing ICU-OH 37271-37309, ICU-OH 37310-312, ICU-OH 37313-37313-316, ICU-OH 40381-40384, and ICU-OH 37318-37320).)

connector and terms (like "spike" and "seal") that are used in asserted claims of the Subject Patents in this case. (Id. at 3.)

ICU's attempt to focus attention on the Subject Patents in this case and the patent asserted in the Medex litigation tells only part of the story. ICU seeks damages in this case based on CLAVE connector product sales and likely will argue the CLAVE connector's commercial success. In fact, ICU claims in this case that "its CLAVE connector and all products that incorporate a CLAVE connector and methods of use" are embodiments of the alleged inventions claimed in the Subject Patents. (Ex. 7, ICU's Supplemental Preliminary Infringement Contentions at 5-6, emphasis added.) It is ICU's burden in this case to show that its CLAVE connector products are embodiments of each claim asserted. Thus, the structure and operation of the CLAVE connector is relevant.

In addition, the withheld information may also discuss and/or characterize prior art to the Subject Patents and the level of skill in the pertinent art. For example, the Medex 841 Patent is a reissue of U.S. Patent No. 5,203,775 ("The '775 Patent"). The '775 Patent is cited prior art to one or more of the Subject Patents. Such information bears on at least ALARIS's invalidity defenses and ICU's damages claim. Cf. Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing, Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (explaining that a prima facie showing of nonobviousness can generally be made when the patentee "shows both that there is commercial success, and that the thing (product or method) that is commercially successful is the invention disclosed and claimed in the patent.")

In any event, ALARIS should be afforded the opportunity to examine the withheld information from the <u>Medex</u> case for credibility and bias in connection with

^a ICU refused to tell ALARIS if the opinions were based on invalidity, non-infringement, unenforceability, or some combination of these grounds. (Ex. 2, 09/01/05 Headrick Ltr. to Platt.)

ICU's assertions in this case regarding the CLAVE connector and prior art. For example, ALARIS should be permitted to explore whether ICU has taken an inconsistent position(s) (whether in connection with an infringement, invalidity or unenforceability opinion) in defending its product against infringement claims in the Medex case and in asserting in this case that its CLAVE connector is an embodiment of the Subject Patents. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 permits the discovery of information that "may simply relate to the credibility of a witness or other evidence in the case." See United States v. City of Torrance, 164 F.R.D. 493, 495 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (citation omitted); see also FED R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee's note (2000) (see § II.A. supra.)

That ICU may have provided other information that claims are relevant to these issues, does not take away from the relevance of the information sought. This information is discoverable.

2. ICU Cannot Un-Ring The Waiver Bell

ICU resists discovery contending that ICU's waiver was "limited" to the Medex litigation. (Ex. 7, 07/06/05 Platt Ltr. to Headrick; Ex. 8, 07/11/05 Platt Ltr. to Headrick.) The issue here is whether ICU can reclaim in this case the privilege it waived in the Medex litigation. ICU did not offer any authority during the meet and confer process holding that it can reclaim the attorney-client privilege and work product immunity waived in the Medex litigation.

ICU has made no particularized showing that the information is privileged or that it can reclaim the privilege in this case. See Weil v. Inv. / Indicators, Research & Mgmt., Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 25 (9th Cir. 1981) (confirming that the "burden of proving that the attorney-client privilege applies rests not with the party contesting the privilege, but with the party asserting it.") (citations omitted). One of ICU's counsel of record in this case was the attorney who informed Medex that ICU waived the

privilege. (Ex. 4, 08/06/01 Platt Ltr. to Grossman (Medex's counsel) (enclosing opinions).) ICU does not dispute that its waiver in connection with ICU's election to rely on the advice of counsel was deliberate, and calculated to give ICU an advantage in its defense to Medex's willfulness charge.

In Genentech, Inc. v. U.S. ITC, 122 F.3d 1409 (Fed. Cir. 1997), the Federal Circuit explained that "[o]nce the attorney-client privilege has been waived, the privilege is generally lost for all purposes and in all forums." Id. at 1416 (citations omitted, emphasis added). Indeed, as this Court has noted, initially maintaining attorney-client privilege is particularly valuable. If the privilege was waived in prior litigation, it cannot be asserted regarding the same documents in subsequent litigation. See U.S. ex rel. Bagley v. TRW, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 170, 184 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (involving inadvertent disclosure).

ICU has cited a case from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, <u>Katz v. AT&T</u>

<u>Corp.</u>, 191 F.R.D. 433, 440 (E.D. Pa. 2000), to justify its withholding of the <u>Medex</u>
information. 10 Yet, <u>Katz</u> supports ALARIS's position. In <u>Katz</u>, the court did not find that the attorney-client privilege and work product immunity could be reclaimed in a later litigation. <u>See Katz</u>, 191 F.R.D. at 439-40 (requiring production in the later

The Court in Genentech affirmed a finding that a waiver of privilege was not limited to the specific district court proceeding in which it occurred and that discovery should be permitted in a later International Trade Commission proceeding. 122 F.3d 1409, 1416-17 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (affirming general waiver where Genentech inadvertently disclosed privileged documents in a district court litigation; reversing the sanction of case dismissal for failure to produce documents that were subject to the waiver).

The other cases cited to ALARIS by ICU, namely Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible, Inc., 793 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1986), Fromson v. Western Litho Plate and Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1988), and Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc), merely confirm that the state of the law at the time of the Medex case was that ICU apparently had to decide to whether to waive the privilege in defending against Medex's willful infringement charge. ICU voluntarily waived the privilege (see note 7 above). Unlike Genentech, these cases do not address the effect of a voluntary waiver in an earlier patent litigation on a later patent litigation involving the same products and/or patents. Thus, these cases are not on point.

litigation on ten topics encompassed by the subject matter waived in the prior litigation).

3. ICU Cannot Demonstrate Any Immunity To Outweigh The Relevance Of The Requested Information

ICU's argument that production would be burdensome fails because:

- ICU has not provided specific facts to meet its burden that discovery not be had because of confidentiality or privilege;
- as shown above, the information sought is not subject to any privilege or immunity, and constitutes discoverable information; and
- any concerns regarding a "confidential" nature of the documents can be addressed under the stipulated protective order entered in this case.¹¹

ICU has already produced one "opinion of counsel" from the <u>Medex</u> litigation under the protective order entered in this case. There is no reason ICU should not do the same for the withheld information from the <u>Medex</u> litigation (under an appropriate confidentiality designation).

To the extent that ICU seeks to preclude the use of such information at trial, such an objection does not justify withholding production now. In sum, ALARIS seeks discoverable information. ALARIS requests ICU's immediate and complete response.

[&]quot;An umbrella protective order has been entered in this case. (Ex. 9, Stipulated Protective Order.) It has two tiers of confidentiality (Confidential and Attorneys Eyes Only).

III. ICU'S CONTENTIONS AND POINTS AND AUTHORITIES REGARDING ALARIS'S ATTEMPT TO COMPEL THE PRODUCTION OF PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS

At issue here are three letters that J. Mark Holland, ICU outside counsel, wrote to Francis O'Brien, ICU's Chief Financial Officer. These attorney-client communications concern an unrelated litigation (*Medex v. ICU*) about an unrelated patent (Medex's U.S. Pat. No. RE 35,841) owned by an unrelated third party (Medex). Because Medex alleged that ICU willfully infringed its '841 Patent, ICU was forced (by legal precedent that has since been overruled) to waive its privilege protecting its opinions regarding *that patent* in order to rebut Medex's allegations. Because ICU's privilege waiver concerned only Medex's U.S. Patent No. RE35,841, the Court should not extend ICU's waiver to this lawsuit. ALARIS's motion to compel production of the attorney-client communications should be denied.

A. ICU's Privileges Remain Intact In This Litigation Because ICU's Previous Waiver Is Limited To The Medex Patent.

The scope of the waiver is narrowly construed in patent cases, and the disclosure of an opinion of counsel in a patent litigation does *not* serve as a wholesale waiver of the attorney-client privilege. *Katz v. AT&T Corp.*, 191 F.R.D. 433, 440 (E.D. Pa. 2000). In *Katz*, the parties disputed the scope of a privilege waiver in terms of the subject matter of the disclosure. *Id.* at 439. In a prior litigation involving Mr. Katz's six patents and one patent application, some privileged documents establishing dates of conception were produced. In a later litigation, the same six patents were asserted against AT&T, along with other patents, totaling over 400 asserted patent claims combined. *Id.* at 435. The court held that the waiver in the earlier litigation would extend to the later litigation, because the subject matter involved the same six patents.

Id. at 440. However, the court also held that the scope of the waiver was "correctly limited" to *only* the six patents at issue in the prior litigation, and not to any of the other patents at issue. Id.

Thus, although ICU did waive its privilege in the *Medex* litigation with respect to opinions regarding Medex's '841 patent—and was essentially forced to do so in order to rebut a charge of willful infringement of Medex's patent—ICU's waiver is limited to Medex's '841 patent. Because Medex's patent is not at issue in this case, ICU's previous waiver does not extend to this litigation.

Moreover, the "privilege is waived only if facts relevant to a particular, narrow subject matter have been disclosed in circumstances in which it would be unfair to deny another party an opportunity to discover other relevant facts with respect to that subject matter." *Applied Telematics, Inc. v. Sprint Corp.*, No. 94 CV 4603, 1995 WL 567436, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 1995) (attached as Exhibit A to the Declaration Of Marc David Peters In Opposition To Defendant ALARIS's Motion To Compel ICU's Response To ALARIS's Requests For Production Nos. 9, 10, 11, 23, 27, 38, 39 ("Peters Decl.")). There is no unfairness in the Court denying ALARIS's motion. ALARIS has not and will not be denied an opportunity to discover facts regarding ICU's CLAVE products, the prior art, or any of the other subjects it mentions. On the contrary, for all of these subjects, ICU has produced extensive documentation, answered interrogatories, and is producing witnesses to testify.

Indeed, ICU's opinions of counsel and associated information relate only to Medex's '841 patent and not to any of the ICU patents asserted in this case. So it is not unfair to deny ALARIS discovery of ICU's opinions of counsel concerning the '841 patent.

There is no support in the law for ALARIS's suggestion that ICU's privileges are diminished by the fact that Medex's '841 patent is a reissue of Medex's '775 patent, which was cited as prior art to ICU's patents. This argument is directly

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contrary to the holding in Katz, which required the same patent to be at issue in both litigations in order for the waiver of privilege to continue to apply. Indeed, the mere indirect relatedness of the '841 and '775 patents is insufficient to justify the extension of the waiver. A waiver of attorney-client privilege with respect to one patent does not waive privilege with respect to another patent, even if the patents are related. Heidelberg Harris, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd., No. 95 C 0673, 1996 WL 514993, at *1-2 (N.D. III. Sep. 6, 1996) ("Mitsubishi's waiver of the privilege as to some patents will be construed narrowly so that it does not thereby waive its privileges as to other patents.") (attached as Exhibit B to the Peters Decl.)

Because Genentech does not hold to the contrary, ALARIS's reliance on it is misplaced. Genentech, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 122 F.3d 1409, 1413 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Genentech involved a patent owner that brought an action before the International Trade Commission based on infringement of four of its patents, and also sued different defendants in the Southern District of Indiana for infringement of fourteen patents, four of which were the same four patents at issue in the ITC investigation. Id. at 1411-13 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The district court had found that the patent owner had waived privilege with respect to certain documents, and the ITC defendants sought to extend that waiver to the ITC proceeding. Id. at 1413. Because the same patents were at issue in the two litigations, id., the waiver of the privilege in one action was—not surprisingly—held to be a waiver in the other. *Id.* at 1418. But that is manifestly not the situation here. The opinions ALARIS now seeks do not relate to the patents-in-suit or any other ICU patent. Instead, these opinions relate to Medex's allegation that ICU infringed Medex's '841 patent. The communications at issue are not relevant to the present litigation in which ICU is asserting completely different patents against ALARIS.

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B. ICU's Waiver In the Medex Litigation Was Forced, Not Voluntary.

Because ICU's waiver in the *Medex* litigation was essentially compelled, not voluntary, the Court should not extend the waiver to this litigation. In determining whether ICU's attorney-client communications remain privileged in this case, the Court should understand and take into account the circumstances under which the opinions were produced in the *Medex* litigation. *Katz*, 191 F.R.D. at 440 ("A determination as to the scope of the waiver must be made under all the circumstances, including the context in which the disclosure is made"). In the *Medex* litigation, Medex asserted that ICU willfully infringed its '841 Patent, entitling it to treble damages and attorneys' fees under 35 U.S.C. §§ 284 and 285.

At the time the *Medex* litigation was pending, *Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible*, *Inc.*, 793 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1986), and *Fromson v. Western Litho Plate and Supply Co.*, 853 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1988), were controlling precedent regarding how a defendant could rebut a charge of willful infringement. These cases held that the failure of a party to produce an opinion of counsel triggered an adverse inference either that no opinion was obtained or, if an opinion were obtained but privilege was not waived, that it was contrary to the accused infringer's position of noninfringement. This law essentially forced defendants to waive any privilege and produce their opinions of counsel. ¹² If ICU had asserted the attorney-client privilege in the *Medex* case and refused to produce the opinions of counsel, it would have been subject to the

¹² ALARIS characterization of ICU's waiver of privilege as "voluntary" has no support in the law, particularly in light of *Kloster* and *Fromson. Terra Novo*, 2004 WL 2254559, at *3. Withholding the opinion of counsel would have resulted in an instruction that the jury could presume that ICU's attorneys concluded that ICU infringed Medex's patent—completely eviscerating ICU's ability to defend against Medex's charge of willful infringement. Like every other patent defendant before *Knorr-Bremse* was decided, ICU had no choice but to reveal the advice it had received from its counsel. *Id*.

adverse inference that increased the risk of being held liable for treble damages and attorneys' fees.

Courts have recognized that "the negative inference rendered the waiver of attorney-client privilege less than voluntary." Terra Novo, Inc. v. Golden Gate Prods., Inc., No. C-03-2684 MMC EDL, 2004 WL 2254559, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2004) (attached as Exhibit C to the Peters Decl.). For this reason, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, overruled the adverse inference, recognizing that it "can distort the attorney-client relationship, in derogation of the foundations of that relationship." Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc). The Federal Circuit reasoned: "There should be no risk of liability in disclosures to and from counsel in patent matters; such risk can intrude upon full communication and ultimately the public interest in encouraging open and confident relationships between client and attorney." Id. And even before the Federal Circuit's Knorr-Bremse decision, district courts had recognized that in situations where the disclosure of advice of counsel is to defend a claim of willful infringement, the waiver of privilege is not absolute, but rather must be limited. Katz, 191 F.R.D. at 441.

Because of the precedent in force during the *Medex* litigation, ICU was effectively forced to produce the opinions of counsel in order to defend Medex's claims of willful infringement or face treble damages. *Terra Novo*, 2004 WL 2254559, at *2 (recognizing that "waiver should be construed narrowly" because "obtaining an opinion of counsel to defend against willfulness was close to compulsory in the pre-*Knorr* timeframe."). The Federal Circuit has since determined that such disclosure was against the public interest. *Knorr-Bremse*, 383 F.3d at 1344. This is an additional reason that ICU's waiver of the attorney-client and work product privileges with respect to its opinions of counsel should be limited to the *Medex* litigation and not extended to this case.

C. The Court Should Deny The Motion Because The Discovery Sought Is Cumulative And Duplicative

Under Rule 26, the Court can limit the scope of discovery if it determines that "the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative" or that "the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues." FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2); see also Richlin v. Sigma Design West, Ltd., 88 F.R.D. 634 (E.D. Cal. 1980) (denying a motion to compel responses to interrogatories because the information sought was duplicative of that already discovered). Here, the Court should limit discovery and not compel production of information relating to ICU's reliance on the advice of counsel in the Medex v. ICU litigation, because ICU has produced more than ample discovery on each of the issues raised by ALARIS. Requiring ICU to produce its opinions of counsel is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, and the opinions, being from a different case and about a different patent, are not important to this case.

1. ICU Has Already Produced Sufficient Information Covering The Subjects On Which ALARIS Seeks Discovery.

ALARIS unnecessarily spends more of its argument listing the subjects that it imagines ICU's attorney-client communications might relate to, instead of addressing the issue of privilege head-on. But even here, ALARIS's argument fails.

To the extent ALARIS needs discovery on the structure and operation of ICU's CLAVE products, ALARIS has already received it. ICU produced 60 physical samples of its CLAVE connector products, both assembled and unassembled. See Peters Decl., ¶ 2. From these, ALARIS can readily determine the structure and components of the products, and see for itself how they work. ICU has also produced hundreds of assembly drawings. Id. at ¶ 3. These drawings show the structure of the

CLAVE connectors; they are essentially the blueprints of the connectors. Furthermore, ICU has produced the "Directions For Use" for its CLAVE connector products, id. at ¶ 4, which explain how ICU's connectors are to be used by health professionals to treat patients. Everything that ALARIS might need to determine whether ICU's products are or are not embodiments of ICU's patent claims are already in ALARIS's possession. ALARIS has not shown that it also needs ICU's confidential legal analysis of Medex's patent to make that determination.

With respect to information relating to prior art, invalidity, and level of skill in the art, ALARIS's motion to compel does not properly reach these issues. ALARIS has limited its motion to Document Request No. 11. See footnote 6 above and Local Rule 37-2.1. That request seeks "[a]ll documents referring or relating to any product, whether commercially available or not, that ICU contends is covered by any claim of the Subject Patent." ALARIS's Request No. 11 is not reasonably directed to issues of prior art, invalidity, and level of skill in the art. And even if it were, ICU has produced all of the prior art that it has, and will answer any remaining questions in fact depositions and expert discovery. So ALARIS's other document requests have been satisfied as well.

In summary, ICU's opinions of counsel regarding the Medex patent and documents related thereto are superfluous in light of what has already been produced. Where, as here, attorney-client communications are at issue, and the requested discovery may be had through alternative means, the Court should exercise its power under Rule 26(b)(2) to limit the scope of discovery and protect ICU's attorney-client communications.

2. The Requested Documents Are Not Related To Any Witness's Credibility Or Bias

An alleged need to assess witness credibility or bias is never enough to pierce the attorney-client privilege. Even if it were, the Court should not credit ALARIS's SA CV 04-0689 MRP (VBKx)

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argument regarding witness credibility and bias. The privileged communications at issue here were authored by J. Mark Holland, ICU's outside counsel. Mr. Holland is not an ICU employee, he is not counsel of record in this litigation, and he is not expected to be called as a witness in this litigation. See Peters Decl., ¶ 5. Mr. Holland's credibility or bias is in no way relevant to any of ALARIS's claims or defenses in this litigation. As a result, Mr. Holland's letters are not discoverable. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party . . . ") (emphasis added). ICU respectfully requests that the Court deny ALARIS's motion.

IV. CONCLUSION

A. ALARIS'S CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, ALARIS requests that this Court order immediate production. A Proposed Order is submitted concurrently.

B. ICU'S CONCLUSION

The attorney-client communications that ALARIS moves to compel relate to a patent that is not at issue in this litigation and is owned by a third party. ICU's waiver of the privilege protecting those communications in another, unrelated litigation must be narrowly construed to not extend to this litigation. Moreover, because the information that ALARIS seeks to glean from those letters has been made available from other sources, the requested discovery is cumulative and the burden to ICU of having to produce its attorney-client confidences outweighs ALARIS's imagined benefits. For these reasons, the Court should deny ALARIS's motion.

1	Dated: March 7, 2006	Dated: March 7, 2006
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15 16	Attorneys for Defendant ALARIS MEDICAL SYSTEMS, INC.	
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1	PROOF OF SERVICE								
2	I declare that I am over the age of eighteen (18) years and not a party to this action. My business address is 2049 Century Park East, 34th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90067 and I am								
4	employed in the office of a member of the bar of this Court at whose direction this service was made.								
5	On MARCH 7, 2006, I served the following document(s) described as: JOINT								
6 7	STIPULATION FILED IN SUPPORT OF AND IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT ALARIS MEDICAL SYSTEMS, INC.'S MOTION TO COMPEL ICU'S RESPONSE TO ALARIS' REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NOS. 9, 10, 11, 23, 27, 38, 39								
8	BY MAIL as follows: I am readily familiar with the firm's practice of collection and								
9	processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. Under that practice the correspondence was deposited with the United States Postal Service on								
10	the same day this declaration was executed in the ordinary course of business. Under that practice the envelope(s) was (were) sealed, and with postage thereon fully prepaid,								
11	placed for collection and mailing on this date in the United States Mail at Los Angeles, California addressed as set forth below.								
12 13	BY PERSONAL SERVICE as follows: I caused such envelope(s) to be delivered by hand to the addressee(s) at the address set forth below by First Legal Support Messenger Service.								
14 15 16	BY FEDERAL EXPRESS as follows: I placed the document(s) listed above with fees thereon fully prepaid for deposit with Federal Express (next business day delivery), this same day following ordinary business practices to the address(es) set forth below.								
17 18	BY FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION as follows: I caused the above-referenced document(s) to be transmitted by facsimile to its intended recipient(s) at the following facsimile number(s) before 5:00 p.m.								
19 20	I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on MARCH 7, 2006, at Los Angeles, California.								
21	FEDERAL: I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this court at whose direction service was made.								
22	PLEASE SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST								
23	Shay were								
24	SHAYNA FISCHER								
25	V								
26									

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